We show that supply functions cannot be classi…ed as either strategic complements or substitutes according to the twofold criterion advanced by Bulow et al. (1985) . This is because while the slope of the best reply is univocally positive, this is not the case with the sign of the cross derivative of marginal pro…t. We …rst show this discrepancy in the original Klemperer and Meyer (1989) setting, and then in a linear-quadratic model of di¤erentiated duopoly. We further con…rm and strengthen our result by proving that the game in supply functions is neither supermodular nor submodular.
Introduction
In a widely cited paper, Bulow et al. (1985) introduce an important criterion to classify the strategic nature of di¤erent choice variables in oligopolistic games. Borrowing a well established terminology from demand theory, they identify a binary taxonomy opposing strategic complements to strategic substitutes. Focusing on price or quantity competition in a single market, it turns out that one may detect the strategic nature of a choice variable by looking at the sign of the …rst derivative of the reaction function (the slope) or at the sign of the second mixed derivative of the payo¤ function, for both derivatives share the same sign under fairly general regularity conditions. If such a sign is positive, then the choice variable is said to be a strategic complement (e.g., price); if it is negative, the choice variable is said to be a strategic substitute (e.g., output). This taxonomy belongs by now to the advanced Industrial Organization jargon (see, for instance, Tirole, 1988 or Vives, 1999) .
The main question addressed in this paper deals with the classi…cation of supply functions. Competition in supply functions represent an interesting alternative to price and/or quantity competition when modelling oligopolistic market games. After the pioneering contributions by Grossman (1981) and especially Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , the literature on supply functions has been growing, also because of the widespread opinion that supply function competition …ts better than price or quantity competition our understanding of some key sectors (e.g., wholesale electricity). 1 We approach our central question …rst in the original Klempeer and Meyer (1989) setting, and then within a model of (exogenously) di¤eren-tiated duopoly where we concentrate on linear supply functions. When performing the test needed to classify the strategic nature of supply functions, Delbono and Lambertini (2015a,b) . For an interesting sample of the huge applied literature, see Bolle (1992) and Green and Newbery (1982) .
we show that while the sign of the reaction function slope is unambiguously positive, the sign of the second mixed derivative of the pro…t function may not be taken for granted. Except along the best reply, the latter sign may indeed be both positive and negative. Hence, as opposed to what happens with both price and quantity competition, under supply function competition there seem to be a discrepancy between the two (apparently equivalent) tests involved in the above classi…cation. This discrepancy poses an obvious problem. Only after a detailed investigation of the second mixed derivative of the pro…t function, we succeed to establish that in the admissible range of the parameters its sign is positive too. However, we may not conclude that supply functions are strategic complements because the variation of marginal pro…ts has not the same sign over the whole strategy space. This is con…rmed by the lattice theory approach (Tarski, 1955; Topkis, 1978; 1979) , whereby we show that the ultimate explanation of the general discrepancy between the two signs lies in the supply function game being not supermodular. 2 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we use the Klemperer and Meyer (1989) model and we perform the analysis needed to test the strategic nature of supply functions along the lines of Bulow et al. (1985) . In section 3 we set up a linear-quadratic version of the Singh and Vives (1984) model which can be analytically solved in linear supply functions, as illustrated in section 4. In section 5, we use the tools of lattice theory to generalize and motivate our …ndings. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
We start from the original model of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) . They assume that the industry demand curve is Q = D (p) ; where D (p) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing and concave in price p; over the relevant price range wherein D (p) 0. The industry is a duopoly in which …rms have identical cost functions C (q i ) ; with C 0 (q i ) ; C 00 (q i ) 0 for all q i 0: Each …rms chooses its supply function S i (p) under the market clearing condition D (p ) = S i (p ) + S j (p ) ; assuming unicity of the marketclearing price p . Firm i's pro…t function is therefore de…ned as i (p) = pS i (p) C (S i (p)) ; which, under market clearing, writes as follows:
Firm i's problem consists in maximising (1) w.r.t. p, which implies solving the following …rst order condition (FOC):
where S j (p) = q j and consequently q i = D (p) S j (p) : As in Klemperer and Meyer (1989, p. 1248), we shall con…ne our attention to the case in which S 0 j (p) 0, i.e., supply functions are required to have non-negative slopes at p = p, where p is a market-clearing price granting a positive mark-up.
We now try to detect whether supply functions are strategic complements or substitutes by using the twofold test introduced by Bulow et al. (1985) . Accordingly, we must (i) identify the best reply function of …rm i in the space of supply functions and check the sign of its slope w.r.t. the rival's; (ii) determine the sign of the partial derivative of …rm i's marginal pro…t w.r.t. the rival's supply function; and (iii) compare the two signs. If the argument put forward by Bulow et al. (1985) in the space of either prices or quantities holds true also in the space of supply functions, the two signs should coincide, allowing one to establish the strategic nature of supply functions.
As a …rst step, we pose (2) and then solve it w.r.t. S i (p) to obtain the best reply of …rm i to the rival's supply function:
The partial derivative of
Hence, best replies in the supply function space are non-decreasing.
The second step amounts to evaluating the sign of the second cross derivative
measuring the e¤ect of a change in
The latter obtains by observing that
which rewrites as
where
for any market-clearing price. Di¤erentiating (9) w.r.t. S j (p) ; we get:
The r.h.s. of (10) is strictly positive for p = p as S 0 j (p) 0; for the same reasons whereby (5) is non-negative. However, since here we are considering any market clearing price, there may exist price levels p 6 = p at which S 0 j (p) < 0 and therefore (10) may change sign.
The above analysis boils down to the following conclusion. Unlike what happens in the space of prices or quantities, here the two tests suggested by Bulow et al. (1985) do not provide systematically the same answer for any price level ensuring market-clearing. Hence, we cannot conclude, in general, whether supply functions are strategic complements or substitutes. To disentangle this issue, we turn to a linear quadratic model.
The linear-quadratic model
As a workhorse, we consider the model of di¤erentiated duopoly introduced by Singh and Vives (1984) . The utility function of the representative consumer is
where q i is the quantity of the variety supplied by …rm i = 1; 2; a > 0 and parameter 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of product substitutability, i.e., is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation. When = 1; the product is homogeneous. 3 The direct demand functions resulting from the constrained maximisation problem are:
System (12) can be inverted to yield the direct demand system:
On the supply side, both single-product …rms operate with the convex cost function C i = cq 
To model competition in supply functions, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on linear supply functions. To this end, we follow the procedure illustrated in Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006). The supply function of …rm i is de…ned as S i = i p i ; and the ex ante market clearing condition is S i = q i , where q i is de…ned as in (12) . The presence of two varieties requires imposing two market-clearing conditions. Taking the individual demand function in (12) 
The pro…t function of …rm i therefore writes as
where p i is (16) . Competition in supply function takes place in the space ( 1 ; 2 ) ; with 1 ; 2 > 0. The FOC for the maximisation of (17) w.r.t. i is:
which generates the following best reply function:
Testing linear supply functions
We now investigate the strategic nature of supply functions. From (19) , one easily veri…es that the slope of the reaction function is
4 The second order condition, which is omitted for brevity, is satis…ed in correspondence
which is clearly positive everywhere. Therefore, best replies are increasing, which, in the jargon dating back to Bulow et al. (1985) , corresponds to the case of strategic complementarity. However, in the present setting, this derivative is @ 2 i
To ease the exposition, de…ne
Then clearly,
and the sign of (21) is the sign of , which is equal to zero in correspondence of
Now note that
where the sign of the denominator may change precisely when @ 2 i =@ i @ j changes from convex to concave. As it is shown in appendix, > 0; so that i+ 6 = i and i+ ; i 2 R. Looking at , it appears that 
Then, for all c > b c; R 0 for all
and
Moreover, e c b c 8 2 (2=3; 1]. This produces the graph in Figure 1 , where e c and b c are drawn. The signs appearing in the four relevant regions are the The foregoing analysis boils down to the following Proposition 2 For all 2 (2=3; 1] and c > e c; @
This result illustrates that, while in a standard duopoly model where under Bertrand or Cournot competition the second cross derivative of pro…ts has the same sign everywhere, under supply function competition this does not apply in general. Moreover, again under Bertrand or Cournot behaviour, the sign of the second cross derivative of pro…ts coincides with the sign of the slope of the best reply function. This, in general, does not hold under supply function competition. However, substituting the best reply (19) into (21), or equivalently into (22), one obtains:
(30) everywhere. Hence, along the best reply the sign of (20) and (21) Figure 2b The case < 0
So far, we have proved that the equivalence between the two criteria suggested by Bulow et al. (1985) to detect whether strategic variables are complements or substitutes stop holding true under supply function competition. Indeed, while the sign of the slope of the best reply is univocally positive (suggesting the presence of strategic complementarity), the sign of the second cross derivative of pro…ts is not (although it is positive along the best reply). This discrepancy between the two signs, in particular the fact that the e¤ect of a change in a player's strategy on the opponent's marginal pro…ts has not the same sign everywhere, prevents one from classifying the present game as one in which either strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability prevails.
The acquired wisdom (see, e.g., Vives, 1999) holds that if the two signs are both positive (negative) everywhere, so that strategic variables are complements (substitutes), then the game is supermodular (submodular) in the jargon of lattice theory. Since, in the present setting, the two signs do not coincide everywhere, the direct implication stemming from the above argument is that the game played in the space of supply functions may not be classi…ed as either supermodular or submodular. This analysis is carried out in the next section.
The lattice approach to supply function competition
The property of strategic complementarity is captured by both supermodularity and increasing di¤erences. The latter concept is de…ned as follows. Let X be a lattice and a partially ordered set. The function i (x i ; x j ) : X ! R has (strictly) increasing di¤erences in its arguments x i and x j if i (x i ; x j ) i x i ; x 0 j is (strictly) increasing in x i for all x j x 0 j . By replacing 'increasing'with 'decreasing'one obtains the de…nition of decreasing di¤erences.
The concept of supermodularity is stronger than that of increasing differences. However, if the function (x i ; x j ) is de…ned over a product of ordered sets, the two coincide. Moreover, if i (x i ; x j ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable over the space X, then (x i ; x j ) is supermodular i¤ @ (x i ; x j ) =@x i @x j 0 for all x i ; x j 2 X; j 6 = i (see Vives, 1999, pp. 24-25) . The latter is nothing but one of the two conditions by which Bulow et al. (1985) identify equivalently strategic complementarity, the other one being increasing best replies.
In lattice theory, the function (x i ; x j ) is supermodular (submodular) i¤ (see Amir, 1996 , p. 135, inequality (1.1)):
for all x iA x iB and x jA x jB : Now we pose x i = i and x j = j ; iA = jA = A ; iB = jB = B ; with A B : Then, we use the pro…t function (17) . Accordingly, dropping the index as it is redundant, we have
so that (31) becomes:
Now treating (36) as a strict equality and solving it for A , we have that the resulting equation
can be rewritten as
where ( ) ; ( ) and ( ) are polynomials. Moreover,
Equation (38) is solved by A = B and
It can be easily established that the expressions of A in (40) have the following properties:
everywhere. Additionally,
for all c > 0 and all 2 (0; 1].
Since we have to con…ne to A B and, from (39), we know that ( ) > 0, the following holds:
For all A 2 B ;
Therefore, since the sign of (36) is not univocally determined over the entire admissible strategy space, we may conclude that the game in supply functions is neither supermodular nor submodular. Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 3 , where we must con…ne to the sub-space A > B , in which the intersection between the 45-degree line and 
Concluding remarks
In quantity-and price-setting oligopolies, strategic variables are either strategic substitutes or complements (Bulow et al., 1985) and the games are either submodular or supermodular, respectively (e.g., Vives, 1999) . We have addressed the same issue under supply function competition (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989 ). The foregoing analysis has shown that supply functions can labelled as neither strategic complements nor substitutes, because, notwithstanding that the slope of the best reply is always positive, the sign of the cross derivative of marginal pro…t changes. This conclusion has been con…rmed using the lattice-theoretical approach, from which there emerges that the game in the space of supply functions is neither supermodular nor submodular.
Appendix
The expression (25) can be rewritten as 
which is positive for all c > 0 and 2 (0; 1]. This proves that, indeed, i+ 6 = i and i+ ; i 2 R.
